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Abstract 
This paper discusses cyber warfare and its intersection with the law of armed 
conflict. Cyberspace creates a unique battlefield with many challenges. This paper 
tackles four of these challenges: distinguishing warfare acts from criminal activities; 
what amounts to an armed attack in cyberspace that justifies a State’s right to self-
defence; target distinction; and direct participation in cyber hostilities. It is the 
author’s determination that the law of armed conflict does apply in cyberspace 
however two additional changes are needed for the traditional laws to have any 
practical effect. These two variations include the extension of the traditional criteria 
of armed attack to include severe data loss as tangible property damage; and re-
examining the framework of direct participation. 
 
Word length 
The text of this paper (excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes and 
bibliography) comprises approximately 7,684 words. 
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Introduction 
Cyberspace has eliminated traditional geographic boundaries. States, 
organisations and individuals are today linked by vast, interconnected networks to 
disseminate information and data at a rapid rate. Everyday activities – from banking 
and sharing musings through blogs or email, to controlling systems and 
infrastructure – occur through digital networks in interconnected infrastructure.  
Alongside the extensive utilisation and uptake of cyber operations, there arises 
a great risk that these linked systems and networks, and the data contained therein, 
may become the target of intentional malicious acts by States and non-State actors. 
It is not surprising that cyberspace has become a new frontier for attack given the 
ease and global uptake of cyber connectivity.  
There is global concern that the nature and scope of cyber-attacks could cause 
far-reaching and devastating consequences. The concern of cyber warfare manifests 
in the law of armed conflict (LOAC) especially given the potential impact on civilian 
populations. This paper will canvas five selected issues in LOAC as applying to cyber 
warfare: 
- Chapter One: Outlining four methods of cyber warfare and distinguishing 
criminal acts from acts of war; 
- Chapter Two: The application of LOAC applies to the cyberspace 
jurisdiction and the principle of State attribution;  
- Chapter Three: The application of jus ad bellum to cyberspace, including 
the prohibition on the use of force, self-defence, and armed attacks; 
- Chapter Four: The problem of distinguishing targets in cyberspace; and 
- Chapter Five: The difficulties with applying the traditional criteria of 
direct of direct participation to cyberspace hostilities. 
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I The methods of cyber warfare 
The first step in this investigation between cyberspace and LOAC is to 
determine the parameters of a cyber-attack. In particular when does such an attack 
cross the boundary from a mere criminal act to an act of war. Given the uptake of 
cyber operations on a global scale, it is unsurprising that digital networks are prone 
to numerous attacks, for a variety of motives, by a number of actors. The benefits of 
using cyberspace also apply to those who wish to cause damage to such digital 
operations, focusing on speed and ease of access. These types of attacks create new 
challenges to information technology and data security professionals globally as 
well as to those who use such information, including civilian populations, 
governments and military personnel. 
Cyberspace is more than what is known as the ‘World Wide Web’ (the 
‘Internet’); the Internet is the open part of a much larger virtual reality known as 
cyberspace.1 Cyber-attacks occur when individuals or groups attack networks or 
data in cyberspace with the premeditated goal to destabilise or corrupt these digital 
systems. The reasons behind such attacks are as wide-reaching as the systems 
involved and may include creating an annoyance to the target, individual financial 
gain, espionage, or more sinister motivations. Cyber warfare occurs when malicious 
cyber-attacks escalate as military objectives on the international stage. Cyber-
attacks which are used solely to collect information, including for espionage and 
spying purposes, are not enough to escalate such attacks into the realm of cyber 
warfare.2 
A Cyber-attacks in the criminal jurisdiction 
It is important at the outset to outline the difference between criminal acts and 
acts of war in cyberspace. Cyber-criminals normally steal data or disrupt networks 
                                                        
1 Richard Clarke and Robert Knake Cyber War: The Next Threat to National Security and what to do 
about it (HarperCollins Publishers, New York, 2010) at 70. 
2 Michael Schmitt Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare (Cambridge 
University Press, 2013) at 192-193 [the ‘Tallinn Manual’]. 
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for financial gain.3 The most common motives behind criminal cyber-attacks are to 
steal trade secrets, credit card details, identities, and intellectual property.4 The 
biggest threat today to private organisations is reportedly cyber-crime from 
corporate spies or ‘insider hackers’.5 Most States regard it a criminal offence if an 
individual accesses information stored on a computer, or transmitted over a 
network, without authorisation or mandate.6 Generally it is also a criminal offence 
to cause damage to data or systems through any type of cyber-attack. Obviously the 
strength and wording of such offences differ between territories.7 
One of the important discussions in relation to acts of cyber warfare is the 
classification of espionage activities. Cyber-criminals can also undertake covert 
attacks for espionage reasons (foreign hackers accessing commercially sensitive 
information) or for ‘hacktivism’ (disrupting services to promote a cause).8 In some 
cases cyber espionage does destabilise diplomacy and impacts on State sovereignty, 
but an action more than a criminal offence is required for cyber warfare.9 Acts of 
cyber-crime, espionage and cyber warfare may look similar and can follow the same 
methods, which serves to illustrate that this analysis is a difficult one. When criminal 
actions escalate towards causing damage to persons, property or targets for military 
objectives, then such cyber-attacks enter the jurisdiction of LOAC. Such attacks are 
acts of cyber warfare. This exploration is one of threshold and may be difficult to 
determine given the methods are the same.10  
                                                        
3 Dorothy Denning “Cyber Security as an Emergent Infrastructure” in Robert Latham (ed.) Bombs and 
Bandwidth: The Emerging Relationship between Information Technology and Security (The New Press, 
New York, 2003) at 31; and New Zealand Government “New Zealand’s Cyber Security Policy” (June 
2011) Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet <www.dpmc.govt.nz> at 5 [the ‘NZ Cyber 
Security Policy]. 
4 Denning, as above; and NZ Cyber Security Policy, at 3. 
5 Denning, as above. 
6 At 28. 
7 As above. 
8 Denning, as above, at 30; and NZ Cyber Security Policy at 5. 
9 Jeremy Rabkin and Ariel Rabkin To Confront Cyber Threats, We must Rethink the Law of Armed 
Conflict (Koret-Taube Task Force on National Security and Law, Hoover Institution, Stanford 
University, 2012), 11; and Yoram Dinstein “Cyber War and International Law: Concluding Remarks at 
the 2012 Naval War College International Law Conference” (2013) 89 International Law Studies 276 
at 284. 
10 Nathan Sales “Regulating Cyber-Security” (2013) 107 Northwestern University Law Review 1503 
at 1523. 
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The line between espionage and warfare is so blurry that Russia is leading a 
small number of States who have called for an international arms treaty on cyber 
espionage.11 These States wish to regulate the targeting and methods of cyber-
attacks used for espionage. Unsurprisingly Richard Clarke, a former White House 
cyber-security official under three United States presidents, fervently disagrees with 
this idea and strongly argues that these kinds of cyber activities and operations are 
necessary for a State to protect itself from aggressors.12 The activities are offensive 
to prepare adequate defences when faced with potentially deliberating attacks in 
war. Richard Clarke argues that:13  
An arms control agreement limiting cyber espionage is not clearly in our [the 
United States] interest, [as it] might be violated regularly by other nations 
[Russia], and would post significant compliance-enforcement problems.   
With blurred lines in cyber warfare also with the application of State attribution 
(Section K), targeting (Chapter IV), and direct participation in hostilities (Chapter V), 
it may be time to look whether an international treaty clarifying these issues is 
required.14 It is especially evident that cyber espionage by non-State actors may 
look and feel very similar to cyber warfare.15 As discussed blow, this author disputes 
whether a convention is needed here and is wary whether such agreement would 
ever be reached in today’s political climate.16 
B Methods of cyber-attack 
There are broadly four types of mechanisms that can be employed for cyber-
attacks. These types of attacks generally occur on a sliding scale of severity with 
                                                        
11 Clarke and Knake, above n 1, at 235-237; and Rabkin and Rabkin, above n 9, at 11. 
12 Clarke and Knake, as above, at 235-236. 
13 At 237. 
14 There is a Council of Europe treaty addressing cyber-crime activities, see Convention on 
Cybercrime 185 CETS (opened for signature 23 November 2001, entered into force 1 July 2004). This 
Convention does not discuss acts of cyber espionage or warfare. 
15 John Murphy “Cyber War and International Law: Does the International Legal Process Constitute a 
Threat to U.S. Vital Interests?” (2013) 89 International Law Studies 309 at 322-334. 
16 Dinstein, above n 9, at 286; Murphy, as above; Vijay Padmanabhan “Cyber Warriors and the Jus in 
Bello” (2013) 89 89 International Law Studies 288 at 307; and Jack Beard “Legal Phantoms in 
Cyberspace: The Problematic Status of Information as a Weapon and a Target Under International 
Humanitarian Law” (2014) Vanderbilt Journal of Transitional Law 67 at 93. 
5   CYBER WARFARE AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 
 
MIRANDA GRANGE - 300237003 
many means of deployment in each category, and each method preceded by the 
previous step. It is noted that this list is the author’s own based on her academic and 
technical research in this subject. These four steps are simplified for the purposes of 
brevity, intended to be non-exhaustive, and serve the purpose of outlining some of 
the common methods of cyber-attack using examples. 
The four methods of cyber-attack are: 
• Denying service or access to a network;  
• Intercepting and redirecting traffic to capture information;  
• Altering or destroying data on a network; and 
• Taking undetected and complete control of computers and networks. 
C Step One: Denying service or access to a network 
This is the first step in a cyber-attack whereby attackers gain access to a 
network or computer and prevent straightforward access to users of the system. 
Such attack is common as it is at the minor end of the scale. A cyber-attack of this 
nature would include stopping (blocking) personal email traffic or access to a cloud-
based storage account.17 One widespread method of denying service or access to a 
network is by a ‘distributed denial of service’ (DDOS) attack.18 DDOS attacks happen 
frequently for aggravation and criminal purposes.  
 DDOS attacks can be carried out is by using automated (ro)bots to access 
websites repeatedly on a network with such unusually high volumes that the attack 
causes the network to go offline (crash).19 This tactic is used both in criminal attacks 
and in conflict situations. DDOS attacks of this nature were employed by Russia in 
2007 in response to the Estonian government’s decision to relocate a Soviet Union 
                                                        
17 Before the rapid uptake of computers, this type of attack was referred to as a ‘black fax attack’ 
where targets were sent never-ending faxes intended to use up the recipient’s toner, paper or ink. 
See Douglas Rushkoff “Extreme response not a solution” (17 July 2002) The Guardian 
<http://www.theguardian.com>. 
18 Clarke and Knake, above n 1, at 13-14; and Roxana Georgiana Radu “The Monopoly of Violence in 
the Cyber Space: Challenges of Cyber Security” in Enrico Fels, Jan-Frederik Kremer and Katharina 
Kronenburg (eds.) Power in the 21st Century: International Security and International Political 
Economy in a Changing World (Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, Germany, 2012) at 144. 
19 “Denial of Service Attacks” Incapsula <http://www.incapsula.com>. 
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World War II memorial. Russia allegedly launched prolonged DDOS attacks against 
government and national websites as well as online infrastructure.20 In 2008, Russia 
again used this method against Georgia and followed these cyber-attacks by 
conventional armed fighting including dropping bombs.21   
Clearly Russia is not the only State to utilise this kind of attack against another. 
China and the United States are also both suspected of being attackers and victims of 
DDOS attacks in the international sphere.22 Members of an Iranian group, Izz ad-Din 
al-Qassam Cyber Fighters, are believed to have carried out DDOS attacks against 
American financial institutions in the past few years to protest the degrading 
personification of the Prophet Muhammad in the YouTube movie ‘Innocence of 
Muslims’.23 
D Step Two: Intercepting and redirecting traffic 
This method of cyber-attack consists of intercepting and redirecting traffic to 
fake websites unbeknownst to users. The objective of these attacks is to capture the 
key used to encode information or to skim (steal) data from users. Such attacks are 
sometimes initiated by opening an email to a fake website, and are habitually caught 
by firewalls or antivirus software.24 Another iteration of this type of cyber-attack is 
the introduction of malware into a computer or network which tracks users’ inputs 
                                                        
20 These attacks have been attributed to the Nashi Youth activist group with Russian government 
involvement. Clarke and Knake, above n 1, at 11-16; Radu, above n 18, at 138 and 145; Sales, above n 
10, at 1504-1505; Michael Schmitt and Liis Vihul “Proxy Wars in Cyberspace: The Evolving 
International Law of Attribution” (2014) 1 Fletcher Security Review 55 at 55-56; and Ian Traynor 
“Russia accused of unleashing cyberwar to disable Estonia” (17 May 2007) The Guardian 
<http://www.theguardian.com>. 
21 Clarke and Knake, as above, at 18-20; Schmitt and Vihul, as above, at 55; and “Roundtable on 
Cyberwar and the Rule of Law” (15 October 2012) University of Pennsylvania Law School 
<www.law.upenn.edu> [‘Roundtable’]. 
22 Roundtable, as above; Leon Panetta “Remarks by Secretary Panetta on Cybersecurity to the 
Business Executives for National Security, New York City” (11 October 2012) United States 
Department of Defense <http://www.defense.gov>; Phil Muncaster “India to greenlight state-
sponsored cyber attacks” (11 June 2012) The Register <http://www.theregister.co.uk>; and Pierluigi 
Paganini “Nation state sponsored attacks: the offensive of Governments in cyberspace” (12 
November 2012) Security Affairs <http://securityaffairs.co>. 
23 Jennifer Bjorhus “Group halt bank cyberattacks” (29 January 2013) Star Tribune 
<http://www.startribune.com>; and Hollie McKay “’Innocence of Muslims’ producer’s identity in 
question; actors say they were duped, overdubbed” (13 September 2012) Fox News 
<http://www.foxnews.com>. 
24 Clarke and Knake, above n 1, at 14. 
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and feeds back information to attackers. Reportedly a third of such attacks involving 
interception or redirection are financial in nature, aimed at stealing individual bank 
passwords for monetary gain.25  
This step has great traction in cyber-criminal acts but does not have much 
publicity in international conflicts as it often occurs alongside more devastating 
attacks in the next two steps.  
E Step Three: Altering or destroying data 
In this method of cyber-attack, hackers gain unauthorised access to networks 
with the intent to corrupt, alter or destroy data. The targets of this step can include 
private and/or government networks for both criminal and/or warfare motives. 
Such access can be gained through viruses and malware planted in a computer 
system; malware accesses the system (as outlined in step two), and computer 
viruses (or worms) adapt and/or delete data.  
This type of cyber-attack is more than simply skimming information. Rather, it 
completely changes or adapts data to the detriment of the owner or user. Or, as 
occurred in the 2003 ‘Titan Rain’ against the United States Department of Defense 
and NASA, data can be deleted forevermore.26 As with the previous steps, these 
types of attacks occur in both the criminal and conflict jurisdictions. 
Government and military databases have been targeted by this method of 
cyber-attack. Non-State key infrastructure organisations have also been embattled. 
Such attacks generally occur through the infection of malware via of user emails 
inside such networks. In August 2012 a computer virus called ‘Shamoon’ infected 
computers at Aramco, a private Saudi Arabian oil company.27 This email-delivered 
virus caused crucial system files to be overwritten and more than 30,000 computers 
                                                        
25 “Kaspersky Lab Study: about one third of all phishing attacks aimed at stealing money” (2 April 
2014) Kaspersky Lab <http://www.kaspersky.com>. 
26 It has not been revealed how access was gained to these systems but terabytes of information was 
deleted and has not resurfaced. This attack is generally attributed to China. See Noam Lubell “Lawful 
Targets in Cyber Operations: Does the Principle of Distinction Apply?” (2013) 89 International Law 
Studies 252 at 254; and Tom Espiner “Security experts lift lid on Chinese hack Attacks” (23 
November 2005) zdnet.com <http://news.zdnet.com>. 
27 Panetta, above n 22.  
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were rendered useless and destroyed.28 Within a week, there was a similar attack in 
Qatar on RasGas.29 Both attacks have been attributed to Iran.30  
Of higher global profile, a computer worm called ‘Stuxnet’ infiltrated the 
Natanz’s nuclear plant network in Iran.31 This malware was purportedly introduced 
into the network through a USB (universal serial bus) stick and had the effect of 
breaking centrifuges.32 The result was that these parts – which separate the 
uranium particulates in the nuclear enrichment process – were required to be 
replaced more often than normal. Stuxnet lay undetected in the plant’s systems for 
at least three years. This attack has been attributed to Israel and the United States, 
with major media outlets claiming that this was the first time that “the United States 
used computer programs for purposes that until recently could only be achieved 
through bombs and other conventional weapons.”33 This type of attack 
unmistakably occurs in the cyber-criminal jurisdiction as well as in cyber conflicts. A 
similar cyber-attack to Stuxnet was reported in Illinois in 2012 where criminal 
attackers caused a water pump to burn out by turning the pump on and off 
repeatedly.34  
This method of cyber-attack has importance in any discussion involving LOAC 
as it identifies that cyber-attacks may not result in physical property harm but have 
other, perhaps more far-reaching, consequences (see Sections N and O). Such 
outcomes include economic and financial suffering, data loss and network intrusion.  
                                                        
28 Shamoon performed a piece of self-executing code (a wiper) which replaced crucial systems files 
with an image of a burning flag of the United States, as well as overwriting databases. See Panetta, as 
above.  
29 As above.  
30 Schmitt and Vihul, above n 20, at 55; and Christopher Bronk “The Cyber Attack on Saudi Aramco” 
(1 April 2013) Survival: Global Politics and Strategy <http://www.iiss.org>. 
31 Stuxnet was supported by a data-mining virus (Flame) and a reconnaissance virus (Dugu). See 
“Humanity in the Midst of War: Blog related to the laws of armed conflict (LOAC)” (2 October 2012) 
lawsofarmedconflict.com <http://lawsofarmedconflict.com> [‘LOAC blog’]. 
32 Nate Anderson “Confirmed: US and Israel created Stuxnet, lost control of it” (1 June 2012) 
Arstechnica <http://arstechnica.com>. 
33 As above; Roundtable, above n 21; Murphy, above n 15, at 314; and Ruth Levush “The New Cyber 
Battlefield: Implications under International Law of Armed Conflict” (10 October 2012) Law 
Librarians of Congress <http://blogs.loc.gov>. 
34 “International cyber strike attacks US infrastructure” (19 November 2011) The New Zealand 
Herald <http://www.nzherald.co.nz>. 
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F Step Four: Full control of computers and networks 
The ultimate goal of those engaged in cyber-attacks in both the criminal and 
warfare areas is not only to steal, adapt or destroy data, but principally to gain full 
control of computers and networks in cyberspace and to lock out the user’s 
administration from their own network. As an extreme manifestation of occupation 
in the digital sphere, this is the specific end-goal of those involved in cyber warfare. 
Such methods would use the earlier described methods, culminating in this vicious 
consequence. This type of colossal access has not been reported in any international 
conflict but is a constant fear for cyber security specialists.35  
G Defending cyber-attacks 
Due to the significant amount of damage that can occur as a result of such 
cyber-attacks there is universal concern regarding the prevention and defence of 
such attacks. Concern is evident at both the cyber-criminal level and at the wider 
implication of cyber warfare.  
Many States have set up cyber-security governmental organisations to protect 
against the threat of cyber-attacks. In 2007, McAfee, a global security firm, estimated 
that 120 countries had already developed ways to use the internet to target financial 
markets, government computer systems, and utilities.36 The United States has been 
particular vocal about their efforts in this jurisdiction. In 2008, after a cyber-
espionage attempt aimed at its secret military network (SIPRNET),37 the United 
States Cyber Command was established and henceforward has a role in developing 
cyberwar capabilities. The Pentagon also maintains the ‘Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency’ (DARPA), which has recently funded Plan X, having the goal of 
protecting computer systems as well as developing cyber warfare capabilities to 
disrupt or destroy enemy system. In June 2009 the United Kingdom launched their 
                                                        
35 Warwick Ashford “Lock up admin accounts to defeat hackers, says Cyber-Ark” (19 June 2013) 
ComputerWeekly <www.computerweekly.com>. 
36 Roundtable, above n 21; and Paganini, above n 22. 
37 Roundtable, as above; Paganini, as above; Schmitt and Vihul, above n 20, at 55; Clarke and Knake, 
above n 1, at 34-44; and Paul Walker “Organizing for Cyberspace Operations: Selected Issues” (2013) 
89 International Law Studies 341 at 341-342. 
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national cyber security plan38 and New Zealand followed suit in June 2011.39 It is 
also predictable that North Korea, Russia, Iran, Iraq, India and China boast of 
advanced cyber warfare capabilities.40 
II The application of the law of armed conflict in cyberspace 
H Cyberspace as a battlefield 
Cyberspace creates a unique battlefield in LOAC. Cyberspace guarantees that 
individuals and groups involved in cyber-attacks can be coordinated in an extremely 
timely manner; that attacks on targets can be delivered accurately; that target or 
attack information can be shared fast; and that decisions can be made much more 
rapidly than ever before in history.41 These attributes exist however inaccurate or 
correct the sources of information may be. States and individuals that traditionally 
could not compete on the conventional combat zone, or could not defend against 
larger States with more resources, find themselves on a virtual battlefield using 
computer code as weapons.42  
The scope of targets that may be subjected to cyber-attacks is essentially 
unlimited and could have vast implications for civilian populations due to the dual 
purpose of most key infrastructure items.43 The principle of distinction in 
cyberspace is discussed in more detail in Chapter IV. Taken literally, anything 
connected in cyberspace could be a target – such as corrupting financial data, 
destabilising key utility infrastructure, grounding an airline, or causing a satellite to 
spin out of orbit.44 This universality highlights that there is a current, real risk if 
                                                        
38 Radu, above n 18, at 146. 
39 NZ Cyber Security Policy, above n 3. 
40 Panetta, above n 22; Roundtable, above n 21; Muncaster, above n 22; and Denning, above n 3, at 31. 
41 James Adkisson and others Law of Armed Conflict: Implications for Navy Cyber Strategy (Masters of 
Information Technology Strategy Practicum – 2012, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania, 3 August 2012) at iii and 1.  
42 At 1.  
43 Emphasis added. Eric Mifflin “The Law of Armed Conflict in the 21st Century: A Critical Examination 
of the Legal Relationship between State and Non-State Entities” (Master of Arts in Political Science 
thesis, University of South Dakota, United States, 2010) at 41-42.  
44 Clarke and Knake, above n 1, at 70. 
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cyber-attacks are carried out correctly, accurately, with an eye for war. If so, then 
“cyber weapons can be as devastating as conventional munitions”45 and may cause 
considerable collateral damage, including civilian casualties. 
In 2012 the previous United States Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta, spoke 
about the brutality that could occur in cyber warfare and warned executives to be 
mindful that this is a very real risk:46 
[The Internet] is a battlefield of the future where adversaries can seek to do 
harm to our country, to our economy, and to our citizens. … A cyber attack 
perpetrated by nation states and violent extremists groups could be as 
destructive as the terrorist attack on 9/11. Such a destructive cyber-terrorist 
attack could virtually paralyze the nation.  
I Application of LOAC 
The modern wave of rules prohibiting extreme brutalities in times of war can 
be traced back to the end of World War II when the international community agreed 
to regulate the use of force to prevent such atrocities from reoccurring. New 
methods of war, including cyber-attacks, were not within the realm of common 
contemplation when formulating these principles. Thus there are some obvious 
divergences between traditional rules and new methods of war. Cyberspace creates 
new challenges in LOAC given its interconnectivity and the spread of use for global 
operations.47 
Do these existing laws apply as is without modification or is some modification 
required? This was the debate in the international legal community during the 
1990s and early 2000s. One of the preliminary arguments focused on whether cyber 
warfare and its weapons should be banned in the same way as biological or 
chemical weapons. This argument has settled now with States and scholars in 
agreement that cyber operations will continue to grow and thus cyber warfare is an 
allowable method of war. The balance of a State’s interest in maintaining global 
                                                        
45 Adkisson and others, above n 41, at 4.  
46 Panetta, above n 22. 
47 Kenneth Watkin “The Cyber Road Ahead: Merging Lanes and Legal Challenges” (2013) 89 
International Law Studies 472 at 474. 
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consensus against using cyber weapons is overruled by the global interest in favour 
of such weapons.48 Richard Clarke states this discussion is settled as it is impossible 
to justify that cyber-attacks cause undue harm equivalent to gas strikes or 
expanding bullets.49 For him “[t]he focus [should] be on keeping cyber-attacks from 
starting wars, not on limiting their use once a conflict has started".50 
There are of course less restrictive approaches to banning cyber weapons and 
that is where LOAC comes into play. The current discourse in international law 
focuses on what laws apply to cyberspace and whether traditional rules should be 
developed to take into account this unique battlefield.  
J The Tallinn Manual 
Following the attacks on Estonia in 2007, the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) became interested in the significance of global cyber warfare. 
A NATO Centre was set up in Tallinn, Estonia. This location was deliberate as this 
was the site of arguably the first case of international cyber warfare which occurred 
in protest to the removal of the Bronze Soldier statue.51 Some commentators have 
called this attack ‘Web War I’ and refer to Estonia as ‘E-stonia’ given its dependence 
on cyberspace.52 By 2007, 98% of all Estonian bank transactions were done 
electronically and over 80% of tax declarations were done online.53 At the time 
Estonia was one of the most wired nations in the world, ahead of the United States, 
and only outdone by South Korea.54 The Russian attacks weakened the already 
divided nation and thus NATO was forced to take notice.  
The NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence was established 
and initiated a process that led to the preparation of guidelines to address LOAC as 
                                                        
48 Clarke and Knake, above n 1, at 239. 
49 At 239-240. 
50 At 240. 
51 Radu, above n 18, at 138; and Traynor, above n 20. 
52 Sales, above n 10, at 1504-1505; and Matthew Waxman “Cyber Attacks as “Force” under UN 
Charter Article 2(4)” (2011) 87 International Law Studies 43 at 45. 
53 Radu, above n 18, at 145. 
54 Clarke and Knake, above n 1, at 13; and Sales, above n 10, at 1504. 
13   CYBER WARFARE AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 
 
MIRANDA GRANGE - 300237003 
applicable to cyberspace.55 The outcome of this initiative was almost universal 
agreement among experts that the existing LOAC applies to cyber space.56 The 
process was led by Professor Michael Schmitt of the United States Naval War College 
– an extensive writer on this subject – and took four years, involved 20 experts, 
culminating in the results being published in 2013 (the Manual).57  
It is recognised that the Manual must be approached and applied with care 
given it is non-binding and only selected experts from the field of cyber security 
participated. A wide breadth of experts were consulted in their personal capacity 
including lawyers, academics and technical experts.58 The Manual is a useful first 
step towards clarifying the international law pertaining to cyber-attacks.59 The 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has also expressed its favour for 
the Manual and representations also observed the discussions leading up the 
Manual’s finalisation.60 
The present problem in this area of law is the interpretation of such laws as 
they apply to cyberspace. This interpretation question is stated as the principal 
reason why some States, such as Russia and China, publically disagree with the 
published Manual.61  
K Principle of attribution 
The attribution to States of the actions of non-State actors under LOAC is a 
problem in cyberspace. Rule 6 of the Manual applies this customary principle of 
                                                        
55 Bill Boothby “UK Armed Forces Personnel and the Legal Framework for Future Operations: 
Further written evidence from Air Commodore (Retd) Bill Boothy, Doktor Iuris, former Deputy 
Director of Legal Services (RAF)” (December 2013) United Kingdom Parliament 
<www.publications.parliament.uk>. 
56 Tallinn Manual, above n 2, at 5; and Robin Geiss “Cyber Warfare: Implications for Non-
international Armed Conflicts” (2013) 89 International Law Studies 627 at 631. 
57 See generally Tallinn Manual, as above. 
58 At 9 and 11; and Levush, above n 33. 
59 Tallinn Manual, above n 2, at 11; Schmitt and Vihul, above n 20; Boothby, above n 55; and David 
Wallace and Shane Reeves “The Law of Armed Conflict’s ‘Wicked’ Problem: Levee en Masse in Cyber 
Warfare” (2013) 89 International Law Studies 646 at 649. 
60 “The law of war imposes limits on cyber attacks too” (1 July 2013) International Committee of the 
Red Cross <www.icrc.org>; and “What limits does the law or war impose on cyber attacks?” (28 June 
2013) International Committee of the Red Cross <www.icrc.org>. 
61 Boothby, above n 55. 
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attribution to cyberspace and thus it follows that a State is responsible for non-State 
actors for cyber-attacks if they have effective or overall control over such actors.62 
This is a scale test and requires specific examination of the facts surrounding the 
conflict to determine the scope of a State’s control. It remains clear that a State’s 
intelligence agency personnel are classified as military personnel in cyber warfare 
acts and thus such actions of personnel are attributable to the State which they act 
on behalf of.63 
L The actions of non-State actors  
The scope and amount of control by the State is important for the principle of 
attribution. Commentary 11 to Rule 6 states that “[t]he State needs to have issued 
specific instructions or directed or controlled a particular operation to engage State 
responsibility.”64 Individuals or groups acting on their own volition will 
consequently not be attributed to a State and thus will not fall foul of the prohibition 
on use of force, though such individuals or groups may violate other laws.65 The 
principle of attribution is met if a State provides insurgent hackers of another State 
tools to fight against their own State. Such a violation may constitute a 
contravention of LOAC similar to guerrilla warfare tactics in traditional battle.66  
When finalising the Manual, the experts also comment that more support is 
needed than simply providing funds or express encouragement; effective or overall 
control would entail planning and supervision of State military objectives.67 This 
control would be enough to attribute the acts of non-State recruits to a particular 
State, and thus that State would be accountable under the rules of armed conflict.  
There is consensus in scholarship that sophisticated cyber-attacks, including 
Stuxnet, must be attributed to a State due to their complexity and sophistication.68 
                                                        
62 Tallinn Manual, above n 2, at 29 and 32. 
63 At 43. 
64 At 33. 
65 At 44; Schmitt and Vihul, above n 20 at 62-63; and Michael Schmitt “Classification of Cyber 
Conflict” (2013) 89 International Law Studies 233 at 246. 
66 Tallinn Manual, above n 2, at 33-34 and 46. 
67 At 33; and Schmitt and Vihul, above n 20, at 64. 
68 Geiss, above n 56, at 630. 
15   CYBER WARFARE AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 
 
MIRANDA GRANGE - 300237003 
There is no conceivable situation where these types of attacks would have escaped 
the notice of a State or a coalition of States due to their exact targeting of objectives 
for a military purpose.69    
III Jus ad bellum and cyber-attacks 
Under jus ad bellum, cross-border military operations are not permitted due to 
the inter-State prohibition on the use of force by Article 2(4) of the United Nations 
Charter.70 Taken alongside the rules contained in the Geneva Conventions and in 
customary international law, this ban on force is one of the cornerstones of 
international law.71 States are bound by this prohibition either by ratification of the 
international treaty or by customary international law.72  
The term ‘use of force’ in the Charter is not defined (which is not unusual given 
the international nature of the Charter)73 but it is accepted that the use of force must 
require an armed attack74 without regard to the type of weapons used.75 Rules 10 
and 11 of the Manual state that the use or threat of force prohibition extends to 
cyber operations.76 Thus if a cyber-attack does meet the threshold of a use of force, 
aggressors would need to comply with the four main jus in bello principles under 
                                                        
69 As above. 
70 Charter of the United Nations (1945), art 2(4). See also Paul Ducheine, Frans Osinga and Joseph 
Soeters (eds.) Cyber Warfare: Critical Perspectives (NL ARMS: Netherlands Annual Review of Military 
Studies 2012) at 116. 
71 See Charter of the United Nations, as above; Geneva Conventions 75 UNTS 31 (signed 12 August 
1949, entered into force 21 October 1950); Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions 1125 
UNTS 3 (signed 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 December 1978); Protocol II Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions 1125 UNTS 3 (signed 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 December 1978); and 
Protocol III Additional to the Geneva Conventions 2404 UNTS 1 (signed 8 December 2005, entered 
into force 14 January 2007). 
72 Non-Member States are bound by customary international law. See Tallinn Manual, above n 2, at 
43. 
73 At 45-46; and Adkisson and others, above n 41, at 6. Other key terms used in the Charter are also 
not defined, including “aggression” which lead to the General Assembly passing Resolution 3314 
containing a Definition of Aggression as an annex. See Resolution on the Definition of Aggression GA 
Res 3314, XXIX (1974), Annex art 1. 
74 States facing an armed attack that does not constitute a use of force does not violate Article 2(4) of 
the Charter. See Tallinn Manual, above n 2, at 52; Ducheine, Osinga and Soeters, above n 70, at 116. 
See also the commentary on the Nicaragua judgment discussed in Tallinn Manual, above n 2, at 45. 
75 Tallinn Manual, as above, at 42. 
76 At 42-45. 
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LOAC. Cyber warfare would need to be undertaken for a defensible military reason 
(including to weaken an enemy); attack only military objectives; have an advantage 
that outweighs collateral harm; and does not cause unnecessary harm to the 
target.77 It is important to remember that if a cyber-attack does not meet the 
threshold of using force, then such actions avoid international humanitarian law78 
and would only be punishable under a State’s domestic legal system.79 
A State can respond in self-defence if it is the target of illegal force by virtue of 
Article 51 of the Charter and Rule 13 of the Manual.80 The right to self-defence can 
only be deployed if a State is responding to an armed attack or when a State is 
authorised to act under a Security Council resolution.81 For the right of self-defence 
to be triggered as a violation on the use of force, an attack must be ‘armed’ which is 
interpreted narrowly and requires serious consequences.82 If the use of force does 
not meet the threshold of an armed attack, the attacked State cannot resort to self-
defence, though they can bring the matter before the Security Council, carry out 
non-forcibly counter measures, or perhaps sue (if jurisdiction exists).83 The United 
States argue a narrower interpretation of the Charter and affirm that there is no gap 
between a use of force and an armed attack.84 This view is the minority 
internationally. 
It is also arguable whether the right of self-defence applies against non-State 
actors or only attacking States. Professor Schmitt believes that such actions are 
attributable to the State and therefore self-defence is appropriate in armed 
                                                        
77 LOAC blog, above n 31. 
78 As above. 
79 For example, the Police and Justice Act 2006 (United Kingdom) which outlaws DDOS attacks and  
§1030 of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (United States) which makes DDOS attacks a federal 
crime.  
80 Tallinn Manual, above n 2, at 54; Adkisson and others, above n 41, at 9; and Laurie Blank 
“International Law and Cyber Threats from Non-State Actors” (2013) 89 International Law Studies 
406 at 412. 
81 Rabkin and Rabkin, above n 9, at 3. 
82 Murphy, above n 15, at 316; Schmitt and Vihul, above n 20, at 67; and Blank, above n 80, at 412-
413. 
83 Dinstein, above n 9, at 278. 
84 Schmitt and Vihul, above n 20, at 68. 
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attacks,85 and there is nothing in Article 51 ensure that the right of self-defence only 
applies between States.86 A State’s right to self-defence in armed attacks applies 
then when acts of non-State actors are attributed to a State as discussed in Section K. 
Given the prominence of United States, Russia and China in cyber warfare 
considerations, it is problematic to imagine a situation where a Security Council 
resolution for retaliation against a cyber-attack will remain un-vetoed by one of 
these States.87 Thus the only way in practice that a State can use force in self-defence 
is if the cyber-attack meets the threshold of an armed attack. The question of when a 
cyber-attack transgresses from a criminal activity to an illegal use of force as an 
attack is an important one.88 
M Armed attack  
If a cyber-attack meets the threshold of an armed attack then LOAC 
automatically applies and retaliation in self-defence is an option to an invaded 
State.89 If an attack does not meet the required threshold then the affected State 
would only be entitled to use force against the attackers otherwise they themselves 
may breach the prohibition on using force.90  
It is important to note that none of the case studies provided in this paper have 
reached the threshold of an armed attack on their own – in the opinion of the 
Manual, international organisations and other experts – as the scale and effects of 
each cyber-attack were not enough objectively.91 The cyber-attacks between Russia 
and Georgia in 2008 were covered by LOAC as they were part of an existing 
international armed conflict.92  
                                                        
85 At 69-70. 
86 Blank, above n 80, at 413. 
87 Rabkin and Rabkin, above n 9, at 4. 
88 Dinstein, above n 9, at 278. 
89 Tallinn Manual, above n 2, at 47 and 55; Ducheine, Osinga and Soeters, above n 70, at 118 and 121; 
and Lubell, above n 26, at 258. 
90 Schmitt and Vihul, above n 20, at 60 and 62.  
91 Tallinn Manual, above n 2, at 57-58; and Geiss, above n 56, at 630 and 633.  
92 Tallinn Manual, as above, at 57-58 and 75-76. 
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In a traditional conflict, actions are judged by their effect or result, not on the 
extent of force used.93 Kinetic attacks are considered an armed attack if they directly 
cause injury, death, or damage to property94 and transcend borders.95 The Manual is 
clear that a violation on the use of force also occurs if a cyber-attack causes personal 
or property damage, and such damage violates a State’s sovereignty.96 Under this 
traditional framework, if a cyber-attack takes complete control of a State’s key 
network, and that control caused injury, death or damage to property, then this act 
would constitute an armed attack as a use of force that triggers the attacked State’s 
right to self-defence per Article 51. If physical damage occurs on a scale large 
enough to violate State sovereignty, and physical replacements are required as a 
result of a cyber-attack, then there has been an armed attack that constitutes an 
illegal use of force.97  
N Traditional framework of an armed attack 
This threshold analysis generated animated debates by the experts creating 
the Manual. Some experts resolutely believed that the Stuxnet cyber-attack met the 
threshold of an armed attack as there was damage to property.98 As mentioned 
previously in this paper, there have been no reported cyber-attacks that have 
reached the threshold of an armed attack under traditional LOAC. It is certainly 
evident that some attacks, such as Stuxnet and Shamoon, caused damage to physical 
property but it has not been determined whether this damage amounted to the 
violation on a State’s sovereignty. The end result is that the Manual is silent on 
whether future attacks of this nature will meet the threshold of an armed attack. 
This investigation will accordingly occur on a case-by-case basis having regards to 
all the facts of the particular conflict.  
                                                        
93 Ducheine, Osinga and Soeters, above n 70, at 116; and Schmitt and Vihul, above n 20, at 59. 
94 Ducheine, Osinga and Soeters, as above; and Sales, above n 10, at 1522. 
95 Tallinn Manual, above n 2, at 54. 
96 At 48, 55-57 and 106-109; Schmitt and Vihul, above n 20, at 59-60; Ducheine, Osinga and Soeters, 
above n 70, at 116; and Lubell, above n 26, at 264. 
97 Lubell, as above, at 265. 
98 Tallinn Manual, above n 2, at 58; and Murphy, above n 15, at 313-314. 
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There are some obvious acts that will not meet this high threshold of an armed 
attack. The Manual is clear that cyber-attacks with the intention to undermine 
confidence in a government will not constitute a use of force.99 Neither will cyber-
attacks that involve minor interruptions of non-essential services100 or acts of cyber 
intelligence or espionage (discussed in Section A).101 Most scholars agree that it is 
unlikely that blocking email access would be enough to meet the threshold,102 
regardless of how frustrating or aggravating this action may be to the population. 
These situations are consistent with international consensus that an event must be 
significant in order for LOAC to be incited, and more severe for a right of retaliation 
by force.   
O The expansion of the traditional framework  
The strict application of the traditional criterion may give some odd results in 
cyberspace which cannot be ignored, particular the focus on physical harm. It is the 
author’s view that LOAC should acknowledge that there are types of cyber-attacks 
that may meet the threshold of the necessary violence of an armed attack without 
damage to persons or property.103 In particular, the traditional framework needs to 
be expanded to take into account severe data loss as tangible property damage. Such 
an examination in LOAC is appropriate given the scale and effect that large data loss 
could have on a State and its population as a result of a cyber-attack. Such incidents 
could be crippling – for example, wide scale personal data obliteration (such as the 
deletion of personal banking or health records) or causing a major stock exchange 
crash.104 Under the traditional criteria, if cyber-attacks cripple a network then the 
threshold of an armed attack would not be met unless the physical hardware needed 
                                                        
99 Tallinn Manual as above, at 46. 
100 At 55. 
101 As above. 
102 See generally the discussion on Egypt’s decision to turn off internet access within its borders in 
January 2011 during a period of civil unrest: Cassondra Mix “Internet Communication Blackout: 
Attack Under Non-International Armed Conflict?” (2014) 3 Journal of Law and Cyber Warfare 70; and 
Lubell, above n 26, at 265. 
103 Ducheine, Osinga and Soeters, above n 70, at 121 and 122. 
104 Tallinn Manual, above n 2, at 56. 
20   CYBER WARFARE AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 
 
MIRANDA GRANGE - 300237003 
to be replaced.105 If a computer system was manipulated to shut down a State’s 
electricity distribution network, this would also not reach the threshold of harm 
required under the traditional model as no physical destruction has occurred.106 
This focus on the damage to the tangible property, but not on the data itself, is 
absurd in cyberspace.  
Regardless of this illogicality, there is no current consensus on a threshold of 
action that would permit self-defence outside of the traditional criteria. States and 
scholars are divided on this point.107 Conservative scholars argue that if a cyber-
attack does not meet the traditional criterion, then it will not qualify as a use of force 
and thus retaliation under self-defence would not be appropriate.108 While 
negotiating the Manual, there were heated deliberations between experts on 
whether the first three types of attacks discussed in this paper (denying access to a 
network; capturing information; and altering or destroying data) should meet the 
traditional threshold. Liberal experts, to whom this author is sympathetic, argue 
that placing malware or deleting/altering data should meet the threshold of an 
armed attack due to the level of harm that could be caused.109 The Manual leaves 
this question open for the time being. 
Current jurisprudence is emerging that battles in cyberspace should focus the 
level of harm caused rather than the violence or type of the attack, as in traditional 
battles.110 Rules 11 and 13 of the Manual simply state that an armed attack that 
constitutes a use of force in cyberspace will depend on the scale and effect.111 The 
Manual’s silence on types of events outside the traditional framework indicates that 
such examination would need to happen on a case-by-case basis having regard to 
the conflict.  
                                                        
105 Lubell, above n 26, at 266. 
106 Geiss, above n 56, at 644. 
107 See Tallinn Manual, above n 2, at 56. 
108 Schmitt and Vihul, above n 20, at 59; Adkisson and others, above n 41 at 8; and Eric Talbot Jensen 
“Cyber Attacks: Proportionality and Precautions in Attack” (2013) 89 International Law Studies 198 
at 201. 
109 Schmitt and Vihul, as above, at 60. 
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Another argument in this sphere is whether the traditional definition should 
be widened in cyberspace to include financial loss. Experts of the Manual were 
divided on whether financial loss would meet the scale and effect threshold.112 It is 
the author’s view that while financial and economic hardship is easy to think about 
in cyberspace operations113 (especially given the dependence on online banking and 
tax declarations, as examples) this discussion strays LOAC too close to the 
jurisdiction of cyber-crime. LOAC is not suitable to be used for acts of criminality 
and cyber espionage114 The Manual is silent on these situations as well, so a factual 
will analysis will need to occur.  
IV The principle of distinction in cyberspace 
The jus in bello principle of distinction creates rules around targets that can 
and cannot be attacked in warfare situations. Article 48 of Additional Protocol I to 
the Geneva Conventions states that “[t]he Parties to the conflict shall at all times … 
direct their operations only against military objectives”.115 Rule 31 of the Manual 
applies this principle of distinction to cyber-attacks.116 The Manual acknowledges 
this extension of the customary law notion that where cyber-attacks are directed at 
military targets for legitimate objectives, and precautions have been taken to 
prevent disproportionate collateral attacks then they operate within the legal realm 
of LOAC, so long as they are not deceitful.117 If a cyber-attack targets civilians, or 
which is by nature indiscriminate,118 then such attack may breach Rules 32 and 37 
of the Manual and contravene of LOAC.119  
                                                        
112 At 56. 
113 Rabkin and Rabkin, above n 9, at 7. 
114 Watkin, above n 47, at 492; and Beard, above n 16, at 127-128. 
115 Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions, above n 71, at art 48; Boothby, above n 55; 
Ducheine, Osinga and Soeters, above n 70, at 122; and Lubell, above n 26, at 253. 
116 Tallinn Manual, above, n 2, at 110. 
117 At 113-124; and Louise Doswalk-Beck “Confronting Complexity and New Technologies: A Need to 
Return to First Principles of International Law” (2012) 106 American Society of International Law 
107 at 107-108. 
118 Tallinn Manual, as above, at 156; and Doswalk-Beck, as above, at 108. 
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It is important to remember that a cyber-attack must be an ‘attack’ against a 
civilian target to be prohibited under this principle; transmitting email messages to 
civilian populations is not enough to violate this standard as this would not meet the 
threshold of an attack.120 This point links in with the discussion in Section M. 
P Interconnectivity of cyberspace  
The principle of distinction in cyberspace is difficult given the 
interconnectivity of networks and computers. Such interconnectivity does not rely 
on the habitual split between civilian and military purposes.121 The ICRC also 
acknowledges this struggle of distinction.122 Developed countries are particularly 
reliant on cyber operations for essential services to serve both military and civilian 
populations – such as water, electricity, communications and transportation.123 It is 
difficult to differentiate military and civilian uses for these services due to their dual 
use character. Targets of cyber-attacks are thus likely to mirror this dual purpose.124  
Because of this inherent double purpose, most developed countries insist that 
their primary infrastructure is ‘double coded’.125 Applied historically, city and castle 
walls were double coded for defence and economic reasons. Today the same idea 
exists for cyberspace: access to military infrastructure is restricted and maintenance 
kept separate from the public mainstream. Yet military targets are still reliant on 
public roads and communication pipelines.  
Q Dual use objects  
Rule 39 of the Manual positions that dual use objects are deemed military 
objectives.126 Dual statuses cannot co-exist and thus, if any use is military, then it is 
                                                        
120 At 112-113. 
121 Lubell, above n 26, at 253; and International Committee of the Red Cross, above n 60.  
122 “Weapons: ICRC statement to the United Nations” (16 October 2013) International Committee of 
the Red Cross <www.icrc.org>. 
123 Robert Latham (ed.) Bombs and Bandwidth: The Emerging Relationship between Information 
Technology and Security (The New Press, New York, 2003) at 14. 
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deemed a military object and can be targeted.127 This rule means practically that 
telecommunications and electricity networks for most countries, including New 
Zealand, would be deemed military objectives. Such dual use targets may also 
include power plants, satellites, or air traffic control towers.128  
This rule may seem extreme initially, given the interconnectivity of cyberspace 
and that military uses may be indistinguishable from civilian uses. Civilian items 
could easily become targets given the vast number of digital networks or 
infrastructure that is used by military and civilians alike. The Manual also provides 
this troubling statement:129 
Although an attacker may not know with certainty which roads will be travelled 
by enemy military forces (or which road will be taken if another is blocked), so 
long as it is reasonably likely that a road in the network may be used, the 
network is a military objective subject to attack. 
However, despite initial alarm, it is important to remember that there are some 
qualifications here. The dual use rule is subject to the principle of proportionality; 
cyber operations must reach the threshold of an armed attack; and only targets used 
for military purposes (if discernible) can be attacked.130 These qualifications 
provide some comfort at least to the author, though relief could be limited in 
practice.  
R Impracticalities of distinction 
As a result of interconnectivity, there have been calls from a minority of 
scholars to ban cyber warfare tactics on financial institutions.131 This argument 
stems from the fact that most individuals and every State (except, arguably, North 
Korea)132 have a stake in the reliability of global banking infrastructure. Thus 
                                                        
127 As above. 
128 Walker, above n 37, at 353. 
129 Tallinn Manual, above n 2, at 135. 
130 As above. 
131 Clarke and Knake, above n 1, at 245-246; Watkin, above n 47, at 496; and Beard, above n 16, at 
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launching an attack against this type of target would be counter-intuitive.133 Such an 
attack on a financial institution could have wide-reaching effects causing the 
undermining of markets and confidence internationally.134 The author disagrees 
with this argument. This idea is inherently Western in that it places large 
importance on commerce.135 This debates shifts the goalpost of LOAC 
uncomfortably close to cyber espionage and cyber-crime. This is not the role of 
LOAC.   
There is also wider current debate internationally about whether the principle 
of distinction should exist at all in cyberspace due to the practicalities of 
interconnectivity.136 As an example, 98% of the United States federal government 
communications traffic is transported through civilian networks,137 illustrating that 
it is difficult, or impossible, to separate targets. Just as there is no current consensus 
on the threshold as to what constitutes an armed attack in cyberspace, there is also 
no consensus on what type of cyber-attack against civilian cyber operations would 
meet the threshold sufficient for a State to retaliate in self-defence. Again this will 
need to be examined on a case-by-case basis having regard to the effects outlined in 
Section M and this debate will continue.138 To date, there has been no international 
treaty proposed to clarify the principle of proportionality in cyberspace and the 
author recognises that any agreement to waive this fundamental jus in bello 
principle is highly doubtful.  
V Direct participation in cyber warfare 
Another important question for LOAC is how to identify civilians whom are 
directly participating in hostilities in cyberspace. Once they meet this divide, they 
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can become targets of attacks under international law.139 As in traditional conflicts, 
if a civilian directly participates in cyber hostilities then they lose certain civilian 
privileges.140 Arguably, it may be unlikely that those involved in cyber warfare acts 
will be captured by enemies or want to invoke protections under prisoner of war 
status, unlike those in traditional warfare.141 One of these reasons is because, unlike 
conventional methods of war, one of the goals of cyber warfare activities is to 
remain anonymous through computer infrastructure, achieved through means such 
as masking your internet protocols (IP) address.142 This is easy to do for the short 
term; this is achievable for the time period required to execute cyber-attacks.143 
There is an immense problem in immediately identifying natural persons behind a 
keyboard in order to respond to such attacks and attackers in a timely manner. 
Identifying IP addresses and pinpointing where attacks originate is time consuming 
and involves technical forensic analysis.144  
S Traditional participation in warfare 
Determining direct participation of those in cyber warfare is complex as there 
are numerous parts to a single cyber-attack and there are many methods of attacks 
that may come together to create a cyberwar. Participants may also not look like 
participants of those involved in traditional conflicts. The skills deployed in criminal 
cyber-attacks look the same as those held by trained information technology 
professions, not just abilities gained by usual military training.145  
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Cyberspace operations may not have the same degree of organisation as those 
in traditional warfare situations.146 If they do not meet these thresholds, then there 
is no action under LOAC. Organised groups in cyberspace are not likely to conform 
to the traditional conditions of groups, such as having a commander, the wearing of 
distinctive emblems or the open carrying of arms.147 It is doubtful that groups 
participating in cyber-attacks of a warfare nature will all wear physically uniform 
identifiers nor will they carry discernible weapons (either laptops or guns), though 
they may have individuals who issue commands or directives. Members of a 
combatant group in cyberspace may not know, or even be able to identify, their 
commander and they certainly are unlikely to be subject to an internal disciplinary 
process to ensure compliance with group rules.148 There is also current debate on 
whether groups that are organized solely online over various locations, would meet 
the required threshold of organization for its civilian attacks to directly participate 
in hostilities.149 They have no physical headquarters or meeting place, and are 
unlikely to meet the traditional threshold.150 
There was also dissention on this point in the Manual discussions particularly 
concerning the requirement of uniforms. Some experts believed that an 
international treaty needs to be created to ensure that the requirement to wear a 
uniform or emblems is expressly waived in cyberspace.151 The author has some 
sympathy for this given this requirement will be unlikely to exist for groups 
collected in cyberspace spanning geographies. Other Manual experts argued that 
this requirement was absolutely necessary under customary international law.152 
This remains unsettled and no such treaty has eventuated. 
                                                        
146 Geiss, above n 56, at 634-635. 
147 Tallinn Manual, above n 2, at 97; Padmanabhan, above n 16, at 485 
148 Tallinn Manual, as above, at 98; and Schmitt, above n 65, at 247. 
149 Geiss, above n 56, at 636. 
150 As above. 
151 Tallinn Manual, above n 2, at 99. 
152 At 99-100. 
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T Examples of direct participation in cyberspace 
It is clear than employees of military, or contractors of intelligence and 
military organisations will be directly participating in cyber war.153 This includes if 
they are engaged to simply write malicious code or executed given code; by virtue of 
being employed or contracted they have forfeited their civilian designation for as 
long as they are under contract.154 Civilians who disrupt networks and gather 
information without express military instruction, but with the military having 
knowledge of their activities, are likely to be determined as direct participants.155 
The ’bomb maker’ is not directly participating in hostilities as the test of 
causation is not met.156 In cyber warfare this is analogous to the person who writes 
the malware but does not execute it themselves. Current jurisprudence is divided if 
the ‘bomb maker’ will be deemed to directly participate in hostilities if it clear that 
the developed malware is to be used in a situation of warfare.157 Under traditional 
warfare, they would not be deemed as directly participating. However, the author 
believes that the very nature of cyber weapons means that the code will need to 
modified continuously to react as a weapon.158 This will require close consultation 
with military personal and therefore the ‘code maker’ will know the intention of 
their output. This involves closer links to the military objectives than under 
traditional warfare and thus ‘code makers’ should be considered directly 
participating in hostilities.159  
It is the author’s submission that the traditional criteria for direct participation 
needs re-shaping in this jurisdiction to prevent farcical results which would occur 
under the traditional criteria. All of these features are typical of traditional warfare 
do not exist in the cyberspace battlefield. Such an example is the international group 
‘Anonymous’ who threatened to attack the United States Pentagon over the Defense 
                                                        
153 Padmanabhan, above n 16, at 290. 
154 Padmanabhan, as above, at 290; Tallinn Manual, above n 2, at 120; and Crawford, above n 139, at 
14-15. 
155 Crawford, as above, at 16. 
156 Crawford, as above, at 16; and Tallinn Manual, above n 2, at 120. 
157 Tallinn Manual, as above. 
158 Padmanabhan, above n 16, at 293. 
159 As above. 
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Force’s detention of Bradley Manning due to his involvement in Wikileaks.160 They 
have been behind numerous other large-scale DDOS attacks including recent attacks 
against the Israeli and Hong Kong governments.161 As one scholar illustrates:162 
If such an operation were launched by an al Qaida cyber unit as part of its 
armed conflict with the United States, then al Qaida warriors involved in the 
operation would meet the belligerent nexus requirement [so these civilians 
would meet the threshold of direct participation in hostilities]. By contrast, 
members of Anonymous, motivated by free speech concerns, would not, even if 
their attack would have similarly problematic consequences … 
Such a distinction may be justified in traditional warfare where States take action to 
mitigate the effects, but it seems odd in cyberspace. Anonymous would not fall 
under LOAC and thus States would only have recourse under domestic criminal 
law.163 This situation does not leave attacked States with many effective means of 
recourse and it is the author’s belief that this outcome is amiss.164  
Conclusions 
Cyberspace creates a unique battlefield with many challenges for LOAC. LOAC 
applies to cyberspace but it is the interpretation of these jus as bellum and jus in 
bello principles that are cause of debate. The recently published Tallinn Manual is a 
useful guide in this area but it is non-binding and does not provide an exhaustive list 
of instructions. This paper has reflected on a few of the challenges in cyberspace and 
seeks to conclude these issues below. 
It is important to distinguish criminal measures from acts of war. Cyberspace 
makes this investigation difficult, as the actions to undertake either act are similar. 
Four methods of attack have been identified: denying access to a network; capturing 
                                                        
160 At 300. 
161 Jeremy Blum “’Anonymous’ hacker group declares cyber war on Hong Kong government, police” 
(2 October 2014) South China Morning Post <www.scmp.com>; and Dana Liebelson “Inside 
Anonymous’ Cyberwar Against the Israeli Government” (22 July 2014) Mother Jones 
<www.motherjones.com>. 
162 Padmanabhan, above n 16, at 300. 
163 Watkin, above n 47, at 474. 
164 Padmanabhan, above n 16, at 300. 
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information; altering or destroying data; and gaining full access of a network. 
Espionage and warfare both use the same methods. They have been calls for an 
international treaty to regulate this area but it is unlikely that international 
consensus would be reached given the current political climate.  
States are able to respond in self-defence against armed attacks that violate 
the Charter’s prohibition on the use of force. The application of an armed attack in 
cyberspace is difficult. Traditionally an armed attack would occur if an attack 
directly caused injury, death, or damage to property. This criterion is too narrow for 
the cyberspace jurisdiction. It is the author’s contention that an armed attack should 
include severe data loss as tangible property damage as such damage would cause 
widespread harm for governments and populations. Financial loss should continue 
to be excluded from the threshold of an armed attack. 
There is a problem of distinguishing targets given the interconnectivity of 
cyberspace. States are reliant on connected cyber operations for essential services 
to supply both military and civilian populations including water, electricity, 
communications and transportation. These dual use targets are deemed military 
objectives. This rule seems harsh though it must be remembered that such targets 
will be subject to a proportionality analysis as well as examining whether it is of 
military necessity to attack and if the attack is severe enough to reach the threshold 
of an armed attack. 
Finally, this paper examined the difficulties with applying the traditional 
criteria of direct participation to cyberspace hostilities. Cyberspace attackers will 
not look like traditional combatants. Attackers are unlikely to wear a uniform, 
openly wear arms, have a commander or be subject to internal disciplinary actions. 
LOAC needs to widen the traditional criteria for direct participation in cyberspace or 
perhaps ensure that such inappropriate requirements are waived, such as the 
requirement to wear a uniform or emblems. Using a strict interpretation of this 
customary principle, attacked States would not have any right to retaliate against 
most cyber attackers and it is the author’s view that this is an undesirable situation.  
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